While our eyes are fixed on North Korea, the Middle East threatens to explode. If it does, weâll be drawn in â and the carnage and cost will make Iraq seem like spring breakęĶ.
Choose your powder keg, starting with Yemen. Ruptured by civil war, the entire countryâs running out of water; famine is biting; and choleraâs spreading like a medieval plague. Yemeni factions fight like rabid dogs let loose in a butcherâs shop, āđwhile Islamist fanatics spread through the desolate hinterlands.
Worsening all, Irað n has backed the Shia-aligned Houthi rebels to gain a foðothold on the Arabian Peninsula. Two-and-a-half years ago, Iranâs involvement drew in the Saudi military. Today, neither side is winning; the dying continues; and the frustrated Saudis have blocked not only trade but relief supplies.
Yemen is dying, the plaything of powerful neighbors, aðŊnd we canât even find it on a map. But Yemen may well find us.
Launched from Yemen, an Iranian-supplied missile targeteðd the Saudi capital this month. A US-built air defense sðŊystem brought it down, but the aðŽttack signaled that Iran is raising the stakes.
Given their triumphs in Syria and Iraq, Iranâs militants feel invincible. No sentiment is more dangðerous.
By contrast, Saudi Arabia is reeling. Riyadhâs struggling to find an effective response to Iranâs empire-building. In its latest â appallingly clumsy â move, the kingdom essentially kidnapped Saad Hariri, the man the Saudis themselves had backed as Lebanonâs prime minister. Riyadh forced the younger Hariri to resign on Saudi soil and continues to hold Harirāđi under apparent house arrest.
As Lebanonâs senior Sunni political leader, Haririâs sin was that he failed to stand up to Iran as Lebanon-based Hezðð bollah provided shock troops to Syriaâs Assad regime. But there was âlittle Hariri could do. Hezbollahâs now the strongest force in Lebanon â its veterans far overmatch the Lebanese military. And the Lebanese, recalling their own brutal civil war, donât want their country torn apart again.
The Saudis simply donât knðow what to do. Riyadh had bet that weâd take care of Iran, that Tehran would push us too far and our military would whip IraęĶnâs Quds Force and the regionâs Shia militias back into their pens. But we backed down again and again, while the Iranians consistently stepped up.
Long viewed as the keystone Arab power, Saudi Arabiaâs now strategically destitute. Despite the hundreds of billions spent on weapâonry, the Saudi military performs poorly. The Iranians are willing to fight it out in close combat on the ground. The Saudis want to fight safely from the air. And so the Iranians are respected and feared, while the Saudis are disdained.
ð§Plus, Tehran has been building a web of alliances, while the Saudis have never excelled at attracting friends.
Our principle Middle Eastern ally outside oâf Israel, Saudi Arabia could, with one grand misstep, prðŊovoke a regional war it could not win. And weâd be forced to save the kingdom, a repugnant use of American blood.
Nor is Saudi Arabia tranquil domestically. In recent years, dynastic changes empowered the 32-year-old crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (known to Saudis as âMbSâ), who grasps the need for social and economic modernization. His foreign misadventures, though, from the Yemen quagmire to an untimely spat with Qatar and the stumbling interference in Lebanon, threaten to derail reform. Popular with younger Saudis, MbS seeks to grant women more rights (beginning with the right to ðdrive); to diversify and revitalize the economy on a vast scale; and to reduce corruption.
That last effort is essential to the Saudi future, but itâs fraught with peril. The recent arrests of over 200 princes, oðffâicials and billionaire businessmen have been touted as an anti-corruption sweep, but also appear to be a draconian move to sideline ręĶivals. MbS is gambling at several tables simultaneously. And every other player is a cheat.
We should applaud real reform but always remain alert: Saudi internal modernization in the face of unprecedented external challenges could prove destabilizing. The shah of IranęĶŋ didnât fall because of his ð (much-exaggerated) oppression, but because he sought to change his country faster than it could bear.
With his catastrophic rush to abandon Iraq and subsequent cowardice, President Barack Obama became Iðranâs enabler. Now, if the Saudis blunder, President Trump may be forced to act as Tehranâs great disabler. And we may find ourselves in the kind of war even victors lose.
Ralph Peters is Fox Newsâ strategic analyst.