President 💮Obama has apparently chosen “intervention lite” as his response to Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people. The phrase he uses is “a shot across the bow” which, in plain parlance, means a rap on the knuckles.
T🐽he risks entailed in such a response are all too evident, quite a𓂃part from losing the element of surprise.
First, by saying the intervention will be limited in time and scope, Washi💟ngton encourages thos🧸e in Assad’s entourage who suggest that the coming shock can be absorbed.
Then, too, Assad might decide chemical attꦿacks are still worth it. If he can break the morale of the rebels by gassing large numbers in strategic places, he might accept US “punishment” that rattles but doesn’t break his war machine.
Finally, limited US attacks may encourage the Iranians urging Assad to adopt guerrilla ta𒐪ctics in his war against the rebels.
In an editorial last Thursday, the daily Kayhan, published by the office of Iran’s “supreme guide,” claimed that a new Syrian paramilitary force named Haras al-Watani (Patriotic Guard) is starting to play a larger role in the war. “This new force,” Kayhan wrote,” is patterned after our own Baseej (Mobilization) and is abl🥀e to hide from attacks b♔y arrogant powers.”
Over the past year, Tehran has trained and armed several units of the new Syrian paramilitary force. Iranian Baseej forces already control a number of localities in Syria, notably Seyydah Zeinab near Damascus. Tehran justifies that presence with the claim that the Baseej are protecting Shiite holy 𒈔places against Sunni attacks.
The Iranian analysis reflects Tehran’s distrust of Syria’s regular army. A similar suspicion about Iran’s own army led th🔴e mullahs to create the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Baseej.
Of course, if Assad does favor his paramilitaries, it will also increase Iran’s control o🌱f the Syrian regi♍me.
I🌞n fact, the mullahs already regard any attack on Syria as one against their regime. Hassan Rouhani,𝔍 Iran’s new president, says that Iran won’t tolerate attacks on Syria. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the new foreign minister, claims that Iran won’t allow the Syrian regime to fall.
Yet, for all these risks, Obama’s “interventౠion lite” can still be useful. The most obvious objective is to restore some of Obama’s lost credibility by showing that w♉hen he sets a “red line” he means it, at least partly.
The next objective is to send a message that the use of chemical weapons has consequences. It’s simply not possible to do nothing after having shouted on♍ the rooft🍸ops that Assad has outdone even Saddam Hussein in barbarity.
Reports that Obama might act have already had a positive impact on the Unit♛ed Statesও’ standing in the Middle East, where Assad has virtually no friends outside Iran.
Assad & Co. have been attacking America for allegedly turning its face away when Saddam used chemical weapons. They forget that Saddam and several associates, including “Chem💦ical Ali” Hassan al-Majid, were tried and hanged for that crime after the United States liberated Iraq.
Today, an attack in response to Assad’s use💜 of chemical weapons should be accompanied with the launching of a judicial process to indict the Syrian dictator and his associates for war crimes. (International treaties signed in 1925 and 1928 provide the framework for that process.)
It is also time to make good on Obama🥀’s two-month-old promise to help arm anti-Assad rebels. Starting the delivery of significant self-defense weapons to selective groups of rebels would help strengthen the message that Obama wants to send to Damascus.
The attacks should be accompanied with political and diplomatic moves. Obama could receive th✱e leaders of the Syrian pro-democracy movement recognized by allies such as Britain, France and Germ💖any.
America would also be well-advised to establish contact 🤪with other el🌟ements in Syria, including some in the regular army, who’ve concluded that Assad is a lost cause.
It is prudent to give some thought to the post-Assad era. Even if he manages to hang on a bit longer, Assad’s presidential tenure will end🦩 next May and he is u♛nlikely to regain enough control over Syrian territory to organize a simulacrum of elections.
In post-Assad Syria, elements of the regular army are sure to demand a share of power. Imp🌱ortant segments of bureaucracy could also be woven into a new tapestr📖y of power in a freer Syria. America needs contacts with them, too.