Benny Avni

Benny Avni

Opinion

The only way to ‘negotiate’ a North Korean solution

SecršŸ’ƒetary of State Rex Tillerson chaired a meeting in Vancouver Tuesday of foreign ministers to strategize allied diplomacy with North Korea. Secretary of Defense James Mattis was in Vancouver too, but mostly ā€œto support our diplomats to ensure they negotiate from a position of strength,ā€ according to Pentagon spokeswoman Dana White.

Maybe it shouldā€™ve been the other way around.

As Tillerson told the participants, Washington organized the meeting to assure the allies are all on the same page. ź§ƒā€œIf all countries cut off or significantly limit their economic and diplomatic engagements with North Korea, the sum total of our individual, natioš’ŠŽnal efforts will increase the chances of a negotiated resolutionā€ he said.

Wait, negotiated solution?

Almost sounds like Hawaii Democratic Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, currently the friendliest face Washington offers to the worldā€™s rogue regimes. Following the terrifying false alarm in her state overšŸ™ˆ the weekend, Gabbard told ABCā€™s ā€œThis Weekā€ that Trump must ā€œsit across the table from Kim Jong-un without preconditions, work out the differences, figure out a way to build this pathway towards denuclearization.ā€

Well, not quite. America does have preconditions. Tillerson highlighted the danger Pyongyangā€™s constant ballistic-missile testing poses to international aviation. And unlike those in Hawaii, the sirens that went off twice last yešŸ·ar in Japan were no false alarm, triggered by actual overhead North Korean missiles.

So America saāœ…ys that before talšŸŽƒking, Kim must cut that out.

Tillerson also rejected a Russian-Chinese ā€œfreeze for freezeā€ plan: Pyongyš’ƒang ends testing, while we cease our joint naval and military exercises in the region.

But even President Trump now seems eager to put his deal-making artistry to the Kim test. ā€œIā€™d probably have a very good relationship with Kim Jong-un,ā€ he told The Wall Street Journal last week.

But even if Kim agreed to our preconditions (big if), whatšŸŒœā€™s to negotiate?

This week, Pyongyang sent diplomats to South Korea to talk about next monthā€™s Winter Olympics. Wanna negotiate other issues? For that, Kimā€™s envoys demanded the return of 21 women who defected to the South in 2016 while workingź¦› in China. Doing so, of course, would doom the women to a certain horrific death, so no dice.

Thatā€™s what negotiations with Kim would loošŸ¬k like.

They donā€™t call it the Hermit Kingdom ź¦…for nothing. Pyongyang deliberately isolates North Korea from the outside world and separates the regime from the people. Kim maintains his fatherą“œā€™s (and grandfatherā€™s) anti-Americanism, and he craves war toys.

Why, thšŸ…°en, would he even contemplatšŸŒŒe denuclearization?

President Bill Clinton tried, sending aid to North Korea while negotiatiš“„§ng phantom disarmament deals. George W. Bush removed Pyongyang from the list of state sponsors of terror in order to facilitate negotiations that never materialized. And Barack Obama tried ā€œstrategic patienceā€ ā€” ignoring Kim in the hope heā€™d beg to negotiate.

Why woulšŸ½d Trump follow any of these šŸ’«failed approaches?

After decades of faux diplomacy, Kimā€™s threat is so real that a fšŸŒalse alarm forces terrified Hawaiians to hide in sewers for fear of radioactive fallout. Imagine if nuclear-tipped missiles were really on tį€£heir way here.

Perhaps the administrationā€™s idea is to present a calm faƧade while the WintšŸŒžer Games are on, only to later publicly float stą¼’riking the North.

True, like all current options, ą¹Šthe military one is extremely unattractive. Yet, when šŸ in doubt America must lean toward an aggressive stance, rather than a conciliatory one.

Our goal, after all, is ā€œthe complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,ā€ as ź¦ÆTillerson said Tuesday. He later added heā€™s seeking a ā€œpermanent and peaceful solution.ā€

Regrettably, ending the menace for good without fiš’Ŗring a shot may not be possible. If it is, it can be achieved only if a credible military option is front and center.

We might be better off, therefore, sending Mattis to a future international gšŸƒathering as the main player, with Tillerson as second fiddleź§Ÿ.

And strictly for strategic reasonsšŸ’Ÿ, why not turn an old clichĆ© on its head: Take the diplomatic option off the table, and stop forever pretending the military one is off limits.